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Abstract
This paper analyzes the long-run eﬀect of monetary policy when credit constraints are
taken into account. This analysis is carried on in a heterogeneous agents framework in which
infinitely lived agents can partially self-insure against income risks by using both financial
assets and real balences.
First we show theoretically that financial borrowing constraints give rise to an heterogene-
ity in money demand, leading to a real eﬀect of inflation. Secondly, we show that inflation
has a quantitative positive impact on output and consumption in economies which closely
match the wealth distribution of the United States. Thirdly, we find that the average welfare
cost of inflation is much smaller compared to a complete market economy, and that inflation
induces important redistributive eﬀects across households.
JEL : E2, E5
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1 Introduction
The aim of most central banks is now to target a positive long run inflation rate which ranges
between 1 percent and 3 percent (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997). Yet the welfare gain of such
a practice still lacks foundations in the literature since the question of the channels through
which long run inflation aﬀects economic activity is still under debate. The traditional result in
the textbook macroeconomic literature with perfect capital markets, dynastic households and
lump-sum taxes, is that inflation has no real eﬀect in the long run and money is superneutral
(Lucas, 2000). Recent research has explored this non neutrality result when the two main latter
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assumptions are not satisfied. Indeed, the eﬀect of inflation has been studied when it induces
some redistribution across generations in OLG models (Weiss 1980 ; Weil, 1991), or if distorting
taxes are aﬀected by inflation (Phelps, 1973 and Chari et al., 1996 among others).
This paper exhibits an alternative theoretical channel of the non-neutrality of inflation tran-
siting through capital market imperfections. If households can use both fiat money and capital
as partial private insurance designs against individual income risks, they can substitute money
for financial assets when inflation increases and aﬀects the return on real balances. Yet if as-
set market imperfections are such that some households are borrowing constrained, then these
households can not undertake such a substitution and adjust in a diﬀerent proportion their
amount of money compared to unconstrained households. Thus credit constraints induce a
heterogeneity in the response of money demand following a change in the inflation rate, which
is at the core of the non-neutrality of money. Since the thigthness of credit constraints is a
well-established empirical fact (Jappelli 1990; Gross and Souleles 2002; Grant 2003 among oth-
ers), this channel is likely to have first order eﬀect on the real economy and on the welfare of
households.
To investigate this channel, we modelize capital market imperfections in a production econ-
omy following the approach of Aiyagari (1994). Heterogeneous agents receive idiosyncratic
income shocks. They can accumulate financial assets in the form of capital to partially insure
against these risks but they face a borrowing constraint. We embed in this framework money
in the utility function. Money is praised both for its liquidity service and as a store of value
which provides an additional insurance device against idiosyncratic labor market risks. Thus
agents have multiple assets to self-insurance and the substitution between the two depend on
relative prices and the tax system. The return on capital is endogenously determined by finan-
cial market equilibrium while the return on real balances depends on the exogenous inflation
rate determined by monetary policy.
Firstly we provide theoretical evidence that inflation aﬀects aggregate real variables in this
incomplete markets framework with credit constraints. Inflation gives rise to heterogeneous
substitution eﬀects between financial asset and real balances across unconstrained households
and constrained ones. This heterogeneity in the answer of money demand provides a real channel
to monetary policy. We also show that the magnitude of the response of aggregate variables
to inflation changes crucially depends on the structure of taxes and prices. Regarding the tax
schedule, the redistribution of the inflation tax creates some (non distorting) redistribution
between agents, which aﬀects the savings rate of unconstrained households. Basically, if the
revenue of the inflation tax is redistributed to constrained households, an increase in the inflation
rate is a transfer toward these ones. It decreases the precautionary savings of savors because
it decrease the incentives to self-insure. If the revenue of the inflation tax is redistributed to
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savors, then it creates incentives to increase precautionary savings to smooth consumption.
Furthermore, inflation tax changes might also aﬀect, in general equilibrium other distorting
taxes on capital and thus the incentives to save. Regarding price adjustments, the variation
in the aggregate supply of capital induced by inflation might change the level of interest rates
and wages and have a feed-back on the incentives to save. It is thus important to provide a
quantitative evaluation of the eﬀect of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model.
Secondly, we thus quantify the long-run eﬀect of inflation on aggregate variables by calibrat-
ing the model on the United States. Since the extent to which inflation aﬀect real economy
directly depends on the fraction of households who are borrowing constrained, we study an
economy in which the wealth distribution over financial asset holdings closely resembles that in
the United States. In this case, we find that credit constraints can give rise to quantitatively
important departure from the traditional superneutrality of money. For example, in the bench-
mark general equilibrium economy with endogenous prices and endogenous distorting taxes, an
increase in inflation from 2 percent to 3 percent leads to a rise of 0.39 percent in aggregate
capital. Moreover, in a small open economy with exogenous interest rates, the same monetary
policy experiment would lead to a 1.05 percent increase in aggregate capital. These outcomes are
consistent with empirical results. Indeed, both savings (Loayza, et al., 2000), output (Bullard
and Keating, 1995) and capital sotck (Kahn et al. 2001) increase with inflation reasonably low
values of the inflation rate1.
Thirdly and as a final step, we investigate the welfare eﬀects of such a real impact of inflation.
The first finding is that the average welfare costs of inflation are much lower in incomplete market
economy compared to traditional complete market set-up à la Lucas (2000). If capital markets
were perfect, the only impact of inflation would be to decrease the level of money holdings
without any positive real eﬀect on precautionary savings in capital. Thus a rise by one point
in inflation would induce a 30 percent higher decrease in welfare in complete market economy
compared to our benchmark incomplete market framework with endogenous prices and taxes.
Importantly enough, this welfare eﬀect is obtained in a the calibrated economy for which the
capital stock is below its first best value. To that extent, inflation helps bridging the gap with
the first best level of production.
Furthermore, the wealth heterogeneity stemming from incomplete markets leads to unequal
welfare gains of inflation. In particular and paradoxically enough wealth-poor agents tend to
benefit more from inflation compared to the wealthiest. This result is mainly driven by price
eﬀect: the income of the wealth-poor mainly comes from labor whose return rises as aggregate
1These results are usually reversed for higher level of the inflation rate (typically double digit inflation rates).
In this case, inflation induces new distortions, such as an increase in volatility, which are detrimental to growth.
These eﬀects are beyond the scope of this article.
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capital increases in response to a rise in inflation. Conversely, interest rates get lower, hurting
the wealthiest whose income is mainly made up of financial assets.
Related literature
There are surprisingly few papers analyzing monetary policy with infinitely lived heteroge-
nous agents facing financial credit constraints. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is this
first to provide theoretical and quantitative evidence on the real eﬀect of inflation stemming from
credit constraints in a production economy (see also for more general theoretical investigation
Ragot, 2005).
Some initial papers have studied monetary policy in endowment economy with credit con-
straints following the seminal articles of Bewley (1980, 1983). But as the goal of Bewley was
partly to find some foundations for the theory of money, money is the only store of value in
the economy. As a consequence, the heterogeneity in money demand and its induced real eﬀect
explained above cannot be found in this type of model, since households are not allowed to
substitute money for other assets. For instance Kehoe, Levine and Woodford (1992) or Imro-
horoglu (1992) study the welfare eﬀect of inflation in such frameworks, but they only measure
the redistributive eﬀect of inflation, and not its real eﬀect on production. Such an analysis is
indeed impossible in an endowment economy.
More recently Erosa and Ventura (2002) analyzed the distributional impact of inflation in an
incomplete markets economy but in which credit constraints do not bind in equilibrium. The real
eﬀect of inflation comes from a transaction technology which is assumed to exhibit economies
of scale. This transaction technology gives rise to some heterogeneity in money demand due to
the implied heterogeneity in consumption. They find that the fraction of wealth held in liquid
assets decreases with income and wealth, which is empirically relevant. Yet we prove that this
result can be obtained without this specific assumption about the transaction technology but
only as an endogenous outcome of credit constraints.
Akyol (2004) analyzes the welfare eﬀect of inflation in an incomplete market set-up where
credit constraints are binding in equilibrium, but in an endowment economy. Contrary to
previous Bewley type models, he takes into account of the possibility to substitute money by
other assets. But, this article assumes specific money demand implying that only the high income
agents hold money in equilibrium. Furthermore, the analysis is carried on in an endowment
economy rather than a production one, excluding any analysis on the long-run real eﬀect of
inflation on capital accumulation.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Since we exhibit a new channel for the non neutrality of
monetary policy, section 2 first provides a simple model which derives analytically results on the
basic mechanisms at stake. Section 3 lays out the full model. Section 4 presents the quantitative
results on the real eﬀect of inflation and its implied welfare gains in incomplete markets set-up.
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2 A Simple Model
Although our aim is a quantitative evaluation of the eﬀect of inflation, we first lay out a slightly
simplified version of our general model to discuss the main channels through which inflation
aﬀects aggregate outcomes. For that purpose, we use a Bewley-style model in which infinitely
lived agents face individual income risks and credit constraints. But we make the key assumption
that households alternate deterministically between the diﬀerent labor market states. This
liquidity constrained model has been used, for instance, by Woodford (1990) to study the eﬀect
of public debt.
We extend this framework to monetary policy issues by taking into account the valuation
of money in the utility function. We show analytically that the Sidrauski’s neutrality result no
longer holds when credit constraints are binding in this framework. Inflation aﬀects the long
run interest rate, even when the new money is distributed proportionally to money holdings.
Consider an economy made up of two types of infinitely lived households. TypeH households
have a high labor endowment eH and type L household have a low labor endowment eL. For the
sake of simplicity let us assume that eH = 1 and eL = 0. Households alternate deterministically
between state H and L in each period. The number of each type is normalized to one, yielding
one unit of labor supply at each period. Eventually we assume that households cannot borrow.
Both types (i = H,L) seek to maximize an infinitely horizon utility function over consumption
ci and real money balances mi which provide liquidity services
∞X
t=0
βtu
¡
cit,m
i
t+1
¢
=
∞X
t=0
βt ln
h¡
cit
¢φ ¡
mit+1
¢1−φi
where β is the discount factor and 1 > φ > 0 scales the marginal utility of consumption
and money. For the sake of simplicity we use a log-linear utility function in this section but the
results hold for very general utility functions as in shown in Ragot (2005). We denote by rt the
real interest rate between period t and t+1, Pt the price of the final good, and Πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
the
gross inflation rate between period t and t+ 1.
The final good Yt is produced with capital Kt and labor Lt. It is assumed that capital fully
depreciates in production. Since the quantity of labor available for production is normalized to
1, the production is simply equal to Yt = Kαt where 0 < α < 1. The demand for capital K
d
t is
such that 1 + rt = α(Kdt )
α−1.
2.1 Households
We solve separately the programs of type H and type L households.
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2.1.1 Agents in State H
Let denote by qHt the wealth made up of money and asset holdings that type H households hold
at the beginning of period t. Households supply one unit of labor and receive a wage income
wteH and a monetary transfer equals to τHt in real terms. With their total income, they can buy
a quantity of money denoted mHt+1 in real terms, save on financial market, a
H
t+1, and buy final
goods in quantity cHt . Due to the deterministic structure of productivity shocks, next period
wealth of type H household becomes the beginning of period wealth of type L agents, denoted
qLt+1. Next period wealth is made up of the return on financial savings (1 + rt+1) a
H
t+1 and the
level of real money balances
mHt+1
Πt+1
carried on between the two periods.
The dynamic problem solved by H agents is
v(qHt , e
H) = max
cHt ,m
H
t+1,a
H
t+1
u
¡
cHt ,m
H
t+1
¢
+ βv(qLt+1, e
L)
s.t cHt + a
H
t+1 +m
H
t+1 = wte
H + τHt + q
H
t
qLt+1 = (1 + rt+1) a
H
t+1 +
mHt+1
Πt+1
Since type H households are in the high productivity state, they save to smooth their con-
sumption and are never borrowing constrained. By using the two constraints to substitute for
cHt and q
L
t+1, the program boils down to maximize utility over m
H
t+1 and a
H
t+1. The maximization
over aHt+1 yields
u0c
¡
cHt ,m
H
t+1
¢
= β (1 + rt+1) v0q(q
L
t+1, e
L) and aHt+1 > 0 (1)
The maximization with respect to mHt+1 yields
u0c
¡
cHt ,m
H
t+1
¢
− u0m
¡
cHt ,m
H
t+1
¢
=
β
Πt+1
v0q
¡
qLt+1, e
L¢
By using the log-linear expression of the utility function, the two previous equalities yield
the following ratio of money holdings over consumption
mHt+1
cHt
=
1− φ
φ
1
1− 1Πt+1
1
1+rt+1
(2)
The right hand side is the opportunity cost of holding money. If the net inflation rate
πt+1 and the interest rate rt+1 are small enough, then one gets 1 − 1Πt+1
1
1+rt+1
' rt+1 + πt+1,
which is precisely the expression of the nominal interest rate. Since consumption and money
are both positive, equation (2) implies the following inequality between the inflation rate and
the interest rate
1
Πt+1
< 1 + rt+1
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The inflation rate can not be too small, otherwise the return on money would be higher than
the return on the financial markets and these markets would collapse. Moreover, the previous
expression cannot hold with equality in this model since no satiation point for money demand
has been assumed for the sake of simplicity. Finally, the envelop theorem yields
v0
¡
qHt , e
H¢ = u0c ¡cHt ,mHt+1¢ (3)
2.1.2 Agents in State L
The program of type L households closely mirrors that of type H households. By denoting qLt
the wealth of agents L at the beginning of period t, the recursive program simply reads
v
¡
qLt , e
L¢ = max
cLt ,m
L
t+1,a
L
t+1
u
¡
cLt ,m
L
t+1
¢
+ βv
¡
qHt+1, e
H¢
cLt + a
L
t+1 +m
L
t+1 = wte
L + τLt + q
L
t
qHt+1 = (1 + rt+1) a
L
t+1 +
mLt+1
Πt+1
The maximization over real balances mLt+1 yields
u0c
¡
cLt ,m
L
t+1
¢
− u0m
¡
cLt ,m
L
t+1
¢
=
β
Πt+1
v0q
¡
qHt+1, e
H¢ (4)
The maximization over asset holdings aLt+1 yields
⎧
⎨
⎩
u0c
¡
cLt ,m
L
t
¢
= β (1 + rt+1) v0q
¡
qHt+1, e
H
¢
if aLt+1 > 0
u0c
¡
cLt ,m
L
t
¢
= β (1 + rt+1) v0q
¡
qHt+1, e
H
¢
if aLt+1 = 0
In case of non binding credit constraints, the ratio of real balances over consumption is equal
to
mLt+1
cLt
=
1− φ
φ
1
1− 1Πt+1
1
1+rt+1
(5)
But in case of binding credit constraints, the previous equality no longer holds, and the first
order condition is simply given by equation (4).
Eventually, the envelop theorem yields
v0
¡
qLt , e
L¢ = u0c ¡cLt ,mLt+1¢ (6)
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2.2 Market equilibria
The sequence of market opening is the following. First, the labor market opens, production takes
place and wages are paid and loans repaid. Second, the financial market opens and borrowing
takes place. Its equilibrium is given by the equality between the supply and the demand for
capital aLt+1+a
H
t+1 = K
d
t+1. Third, the new money is given to households and the money market
opens. The money market equilibrium is mHt+1 +m
L
t+1 = Ωt, where Ωt is the real quantity of
money in circulation at the end of period t. Finally, the good market opens. Its equilibrium
simply reads Yt = cHt +c
L
t +Kt+1. Firms buy and instal their capital to produce the next period,
households consume and use money for liquidity services.
We assume that monetary policy follows a simple rule, which is to increase the nominal
stock of money by a given amount π at each period, πPt−1Ωt−1. The whole newly created
money is given to households by lump sum transfers denoted by τHt and τ
L
t in real terms. As a
consequence, Pt
¡
τHt + τ
L
t
¢
= πPt−1Ωt−1 and hence,
τHt + τ
L
t =
π
Πt
Ωt−1
In this simple model, we focus on stationary equilibrium where the inflation rate Π and all
the real variables aH , aL, qH , qL,mL,mH , cL, cH ,K, Ω and r are constant. As a consequence,
we drop the time subscript except for nominal variables, which grow at a rate π, with Π = 1+π.
To prove that inflation has a real eﬀect which truly transits through credit constraints and not
through distorting taxes or redistributive mechanism as previously identified in the literature,
we assume henceforth a extreme case of completely neutral distribution of money. The inflation
tax is redistributed as a lump sum transfer proportional to the beginning of period level of
real balances, implying τH = π1+πm
L and τL = π1+πm
H . As a consequence, the inflation tax
paid by private agents on their money balances is exactly redistributed as lump sum transfers.
This assumption cancels out any redistribution eﬀect of the inflation between types H and L
households. Indeed, the two budget constraints can be written as
cH +mH + aH = mL +w (7)
cL +mL + aL = (1 + r) aH +mH (8)
and inflation does not appear in the budget constraints.
2.3 Impact of monetary policy
The long-run eﬀect of monetary policy crucially depends on the thigthness of credit constraints.
We thus need to exhibit the conditions under which credit constraints are binding. Firstly, if no
one is borrowing constrained in the economy, then by using the first order conditions and the
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envelop conditions in a stationary equilibrium, one finds the standard Euler equations:
u0c
¡
cL,mL
¢
= β (1 + r)u0c
¡
cH ,mH
¢
u0c
¡
cH ,mH
¢
= β (1 + r)u0c
¡
cL,mL
¢
what immediately yields 1 + r = 1β . Secondly, credit constraints are binding if - and only if
- : u0c
¡
cL,mL
¢
> β (1 + r) v0q
¡
qH , eH
¢
. Using the equality (3) to substitute for v0q
¡
qH , eH
¢
,
and equalities (1) and (3) in a stationary state, one finds 1 + r < 1β . The result is that credit
constraints are binding when the equilibrium interest rate is lower than the inverse of the discount
factor, which is standard in this type of model (Woodford, 1990; Kehoe and Levine 2001, among
others). This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Credit constraints of agents L are binding in a stationary equilibrium if and
only if 1 + r < 1β . If credit constraints never bind then 1 + r =
1
β .
This proposition implies that the real interest rate is constant and is not aﬀected by the
inflation rate when credit constraints do not bind. But this neutrality result no longer holds
when credit constraints are binding as discussed below.
2.3.1 Non-Binding Credit Constraints
To illustrate the neutrality of money when constraints are not binding, one can first rewrite
equations (2) and (5) at the stationary equilibrium, which yields for i = {H,L}
mi
ci
=
1− φ
φ
1
1− 1Π
1
1+r
Thus all agents are aﬀected to the same extent by an increase in inflation irrespective of the
labor endowment
∂m
H
cH
∂Π
=
∂m
L
cL
∂Π
< 0 (9)
When inflation increases, type H households prefer to buy less money. But, they already
reduced their level of real balances by using more capital and less money in the previous period.
Thus they transferred less resources toward state H. The key point is thus that the decrease in
their level of real balances is exactly equal to the decrease in their total resources. As a matter
of fact inflation has no eﬀect on real variables since it aﬀects exactly in the same way each agent.
We are back to the standard Sidrauski result according to which inflation has no real impact
but decreases the demand for money and the utility of households.
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2.3.2 Binding Credit Constraints
The neutrality of inflation breaks down when credit constraints bind since inflation aﬀects diﬀer-
ently constrained and unconstrained agents. Note first that when credit constraints are binding,
real balances held by type L households are the only store of value which allows for consumption
smoothing. Using equations (1), (3) and (4) one finds in this case
mL
cL
=
1− φ
φ
1
1− β
2
Π (1 + r)
(10)
But since 1 + r < 1β when credit constraints are binding, the expression above is diﬀerent
from that of households of type H given by equation (2). Indeed, the equilibrium ratio for
L agents is no more determined by the opportunity cost to hold money, but by the diﬀerence
between consumption the current period and the return on money holdings two periods ahead.
Indeed, the ratio β
2(1+r)
Π is the discounted value of one unit of money held in state L, transferred
in state H, and then saved on financial market to the next period, where the household is in
state L again.
As a matter of fact, the reaction of the two types of agents diﬀer when they face a change
in inflation. Comparing equations (2) and (10), one gets that
0 >
∂m
L
cL
∂Π
>
∂m
H
cH
∂Π
(11)
The following proposition summarizes the non-neutrality of inflation, the proof of which is
left in appendix.
Proposition 2 If credit constraints are binding in the stationary equilibrium, the real interest
rate decreases when inflation increases.
The rationale for this result lies in the fact that m
H
cH decreases more rapidly than
mL
cL as the
inflation rate increases. Actually for a given interest rate, type H households, who are the only
net savers in this economy, increase their level of asset holdings at the expense of real balances.
This is the first eﬀect of inflation well-known as the Tobin eﬀect : inflation induces a shift away
from money whose return decreases. The heterogeneity of this Tobin eﬀects across agents is
precisely at the core of the non-neutrality of money.
The magnitude of the non-neutrality of money might depend on the way the inflation tax
is redistributed to households and on the adjustment of prices of factors in general equilibrium.
First inflation might induce a redistributive eﬀect. So far we have assumed that the inflation tax
was redistributed to all agents. But any transfer from high income agents to low income agents
aﬀects the incentive to save. For instance, if the additional money is redistributed to low agents
such that τL = π1+πΩ and τ
H = 0, then inflation provides some extra revenue to the constrained
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agents, which decrease the incentives to save in the high state. Conversely if the additional
money is given to agents H, such that τL = 0 and τH = π1+πΩ, then inflation is a transfer
from constrained to unconstrained agents which will favor savings. This eﬀect can be called
the redistributive eﬀect of inflation, and it only arises from the existence of credit constraints.
Second, the change in saving behavior aﬀects the real interest rate and real wages, which brings
about an additional eﬀect on money demand. This is a standard price eﬀect which appears in
general equilibrium.
3 The General Model
We describe a fully-fledged model encompassing more general assumptions about income risks,
which is studied quantitatively in Section 4. The economy we consider builds on the tradi-
tional heterogeneous agents framework à la Aiyagari (1994). This is an incomplete markets
economy with stochastic individual risks and borrowing constraints. The key new feature is the
introduction of money in the utility function and monetary policy in this framework.
3.1 Agents
3.1.1 Households
The economy consists of a unit mass of ex ante identical and infinitely-lived households. In-
dividuals are subject to idiosyncratic shocks on their labor productivity et. We assume that
et follows a three state Markov process over time with et ∈
©
eh, em, el
ª
where eh stands for
high productivity, em for medium productivity, el for low productivity, and with a 3 × 3 tran-
sition matrix2 Q. The probability distribution across productivity is represented by a vector
nt = {nht , nmt , nlt}: nt ≥ 0 and nht + nmt + nlt = 1. Under technical conditions, that we assume
to be fulfilled, the transition matrix has a unique vector n∗ = {nh, nm, nl} such that n∗ = n∗Q.
Hence, the nt converges toward n∗ in the long run. n∗ is distribution of the population in each
state. For instance, nh is the proportion of the population who has a high productivity.
Markets are incomplete and no borrowing is allowed. In lines with Aiyagari (1994), they can
self-insure against employment risks by accumulating a riskless asset a which yields a return r.
But they can also accumulate real money assets m, which introduces a new channel compared
to the previous heterogeneous agent literature.
2This assumption is based on Domeij and Heatchcote (2003) who found that one needs at least three em-
ployment states to match crucial empirical features of the employment process and wealth distribution. See the
section devoted to the calibration of the model.
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For the sake of generality, we follow the literature which introduces directly money in the
utility function of private agents to summarize the liquidity services it oﬀers. If the price level of
the final good at period t is denoted Pt, the gross inflation rate between period t− 1 and period
t is Πt = PtPt−1 . If an household holds a real amount mt of money at the end of period t− 1, the
real value of her money balances at period t is mtΠt . As long as Πt >
1
1+rt
, money is a strictly
dominated assets, but which will be demanded for its liquidity services. Households are not
allowed to borrow and can not issue some money. As a consequence, the demand for final goods,
the demand for financial assets and for money satisfies at each period t, ct ≥ 0, at ≥ 0,mt ≥ 0
The preferences over the streams of consumption of final goods and of money is given by
E0
∞X
t=0
βtu (ct,mt+1)
It will be assumed that the utility function has a simple form used by Chari, Kehoe and Mc-
Grattan (2000), among others
u (c,m) =
1
1− σ
∙³
ωc
η−1
η + (1− ω)m
η−1
η
´ η
η−1
¸1−σ
(12)
where η > 0 stands for the elasticity of substitution between consumption and money, ω (1 −
ω) refers to the relative weight of consumption (money) and σ is the standard intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
The budget constraint of households at each period is,
ct + at+1 +mt+1 = (1 + rt) at +wtet +
mt
Πt
The value rt is the after-tax return on financial assets, et is the productivity level of the worker
at period t, and wt is the after-tax revenue on labor.
For the sake of realism, we assume that there is a linear tax on private government income.
The tax rate on capital at period t is denoted χat and the tax rate on labor is denoted χ
w
t . As a
consequence, if r˜t and w˜t are the revenue of capital and labor paid by the firms, the returns for
households satisfy the following relationship
rt = r˜t(1− χat )
wt = w˜t(1− χwt )
The solution of the problem of households is given by a sequence of function mt, at, ct which
maximizes expected utility given the sequence of budget constraints, and the after tax wages
wt, the real interest rate rt and the gross inflation rate Πt. There is no aggregate uncertainty
and r and Π are thus constant.
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Let total wealth in period t be qt. Then
qt = (1 + rt) at +
mt
Πt
With this changes, the dynamic programming problem solved by agents is
v (qt, et) = max{ct,at+1,mt+1}
u (ct,mt+1) + βE [v (qt+1, et+1)]
s.t ct + at+1 +mt+1 = qt + wtet
qt+1 = (1 + rt+1) at+1 +
mt+1
Πt+1
at+1 ≥ 0, ct ≥ 0, mt+1 ≥ 0
and with the transition probability for labor productivity given by the matrix Q. Since the
eﬀect of inflation on individual behavior heavily depends on whether the credit constraints are
binding, we distinguish two cases.
• Binding credit constraints
When the household problem yields a value for financial savings which is negative, credits
constraints are binding and the first order condition yields the inequality
u0c (ct,mt+1) > β (1 + rt+1)E
£
v01 (qt+1, et+1)
¤
In this case, the problem of the household can be simplified as
v (qt, et) = max{ct,,mt+1}
u (ct,mt+1) + βE [v (qt+1, et+1)] (13)
ct +mt+1 = qt + wtet (14)
qt+1 =
mt+1
Πt+1
which yields the following expression for the value function:
v (qt, et) = max
mt+1
u (qt + wtet −mt+1,mt+1) + βE
∙
v
µ
mt+1
Πt+1
, eit+1
¶¸
The first order condition is
u0c (ct,mt+1)− u0m (ct,mt+1) =
1
Πt+1
βE
∙
v0
µ
mt+1
Πt+1
, eit+1
¶¸
(15)
Money demand has no simple expression in case of binding-constraints. The static trade-oﬀ
between demand for money and demand for consumption appears at the left hand side. If
money was not a store of value, this expression would be equal to 0. But, as money allows to
transfer revenue to the next period, it creates an additional motive to demand it.
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Importantly enough, inflation turns out to have two contrasting eﬀect on the demand for
money of borrowing constrained households, what can be seen at the right hand side. On the
one hand, inflation induces a substitution eﬀect which contributes to decrease the demand for
money when inflation increases (represented by the term 1Πt+1 ). On the other hand, the inflation
rate entering into the value function through a revenue eﬀect, it might induce an increase in
demand for money when inflation increases. The core reason for this result is that money is
the only store of value for borrowing constrained households. If the function v is very concave,
and for realistic values of the parameters, this second eﬀect can dominate, and the demand for
money can increase with inflation. We will show in the quantitative analysis that this result
holds for the poorest agents.
As a consequence, this case proves that the change in money demand because of inflation,
what we call the Tobin eﬀect, can be decomposed into a revenue eﬀect and a substitution eﬀect
for the constrained households.
• Non Binding credit constraints
In this case, the first order condition reads as follows
u0c (ct,mt+1) = β (1 + rt+1)E
£
v01 (qt+1, et+1)
¤
u0m (ct,mt+1) = β
µ
1 + rt+1 −
1
Πt+1
¶
E
£
v01 (qt+1, et+1)
¤
Let define the real cost of money holdings γt+1 by
γt+1 ≡ 1−
1
Πt+1
1
(1 + rt+1)
This indicator measures the opportunity cost to hold money. When the after-tax nominal
interest rate rnt+1, defined by 1 + r
n
t+1 = Πt+1 (1 + rt+1) is small, then one can check that
γt+1 ' rnt+1. With this notation and the expression of the utility function given above, the first
order conditions yield
mt+1 =
µ
1− ω
ω
1
γt+1
¶η
ct
The coeﬃcient −η represents the interest elasticity of money demand. The coeﬃcient ω scales
the level of the money demand. The previous equality yields that the money demand of un-
constrained households is only aﬀected by the substitution eﬀect depending on the opportunity
cost to hold money.
3.1.2 Firms
We assume that all markets are competitive and the only good consumed is produced by a rep-
resentative firm with an aggregate Cobb-Douglas technology. Let Kt and Lt stand for aggregate
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capital and aggregate employment rate respectively. It is assumed that capital depreciate at a
constant rate δ and that it is installed one period before production. As there is no aggregate
uncertainty, aggregate employment and, more generally, aggregate variables are constant.
The output is given by
Yt = F (Kt, Lt) = Kαt L
1−α
t 0 < α < 1
with
Lt = nht e
h + nmt e
m + nlte
l
Prices are set competitively:
w˜t = (1− α) (Kt/Lt)α (16)
r˜t + δ = α(Kt/Lt)
α−1 (17)
with
w˜ht = e
hw˜t, w˜mt = e
mw˜t, w˜lt = e
lw˜t (18)
And the aggregate demand for capital by firms is given by
Kdt = Lt(α/(r˜t + δ))
1
1−α
3.1.3 Government
The government levies taxes to finance a public good, which costs G unit of final goods at each
period. Taxes are proportional to the revenue of capital and labor, with a coeﬃcient χat and χ
w
t
at period t. In addition, the government gets the revenue of the new money created at period t,
which is denoted τ t in real term.
It is assumed that the government does not issue any debt. The government budget con-
straint is given by
G = χat r˜tKt + χ
w
t
³
nht e
h
t + n
l
te
l
t + n
m
t e
m
t
´
w˜t + τ t (19)
3.2 Equilibrium
Market Equilibria
Let λt : E × R+ −→ [0, 1] denote the joint distribution of agents over productivity and
wealth. Aggregate consumption Ct, aggregate money holdings Mt+1, and aggregate financial
savings At+1 are given by
Ct =
Z Z
ct
³
ek, q
´
λt
³
ek, q
´
dqde
Mt+1 =
Z Z
mt+1
³
ek, q
´
λt
³
ek, q
´
dqde
At+1 =
Z Z
at+1
³
ek, q
´
λt
³
ek, q
´
dqde
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The sequence of market openings is the same as in the previous section : the labor, financial,
money and good markets open successively. Equilibrium in the final good market implies
Ct +Kt+1 +Gt = Yt + (1− δ)Kt (20)
Equilibrium in the financial market implies
Kdt+1 = At+1 (21)
The money market equilibrium is defined by
Mt+1 = Ωt (22)
where Ωt is the real quantity of money in circulation at period t.
Monetary Policy
The monetary policy is assumed to follow a simple rule. At each period, the monetary
authorities create some new money by selling on the money market a nominal amount of money
which is proportional with a factor π to the nominal quantity of money in circulation, PtΩt =
Pt−1Ωt−1 + πPt−1Ωt−1. This process of money creation is a shortcut of open market practices
and implies that the State gets all the revenue from the inflation tax. Indeed, the profits of
central banks are redistributed to the State and are not used for specific purposes. Moreover,
this process is more suited to the heterogenous agents framework than the helicopter drops of
money, as it is argued in Akyol (2004). As a result,
Ωt =
Ωt−1
Πt
+ π
Ωt−1
Πt
(23)
As a consequence, the value of the inflation tax is
τ t = π
Ωt
Πt
(24)
Note that if the real quantity of money in circulation is constant (which is the case in equi-
librium), equation (23) implies that Π = 1 + π, and hence τ = π1+πΩ, what is the standard
expression of the inflation tax.
Competitive equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of decision rules c(e, q),
a(e, q), and m(e, q) respectively for consumption, financial asset holdings and real balances,
the steady state joint distribution over wealth and productivity λ(e, q), the real return of finan-
cial asset r, the real wage w, the real return on real balances 1/Π, and tax transfers χa , χw ,
consistent with the exogenous supply of money π and the government public spending G such
that
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1. The long run distribution of productivity is given by a constant vector n∗.
2. The functions a, c,m which solves the problem of the households
3. The joint distribution λ over productivity and wealth is time invariant.
4. Factor prices are competitively determined, by equation (16)-(18).
5. Markets clear, equations (20)-(22).
6. The quantity of money in circulation follows the law of motion (23)
7. The tax rates χa and χw are constant and are defined to balance the budget of the State
(19), where the revenue from the inflation tax τ is given by (24).
Note that because of equilibrium on the money market and the stationarity of the joint
distribution imply that the real quantity of money in circulation is constant.
Summary of the eﬀects of monetary policy
In the presence of credit constraints, inflation is expected to aﬀect private savings because of
four eﬀects. 1) Tobin Eﬀect : It has been shown that an increase in the cost of money induces
a diﬀerent shift toward consumption and financial savings for unconstrained and constrained
agents. As proven in the previous section, this eﬀect exists only because of credit constraints.
Moreover, it can be decomposed in a substitution and a revenue eﬀect for constrained households.
2) Redistributive Eﬀect: As public spending is assumed to be constant and equal to G, the
inflation tax changes the tax structure of the government revenue, which has redistributive
eﬀect because of the linear tax schedule. But redistribution has a real eﬀect because it can
either increase or decrease the insurance in case of binding credit constraints. This real eﬀect of
a non distorting tax exists only because of the binding credit constraints. 3) Distorting tax eﬀect
: Inflation raises additional resources which can induce a decrease in the linear tax schedule on
capital, which alleviate the negative eﬀect of this distorting taxation scheme. This eﬀect does
not depend on credit constraints, and can be found in various types of model (Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe, 1996) and was mentioned by Phelps (1973). 4) Price eﬀect : Finally, as inflation
aﬀects savings, it aﬀects capital accumulation, the real interest rate and the real wage. This
change in prices aﬀect the behavior of private agents. The next section provides a quantitative
evaluation of these diﬀerent channels.
3.3 Calibration
Technology and Utility
The model period is one year and the model is calibrated on the US economy. Since the
primary interest of the paper lies on the interactions between wealth heterogeneity and monetary
policy, the key goal of the calibration is to match the observed distributions of wealth and
consumptions.
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Table 2 reports the preference and technology parameters. The parameters relating to the
production technology and the discount factor are standard with a capital share α set equal to
0.36, the capital depreciation rate is 0.1 and the discount factor is set to 0.96.
Regarding the utility function, we follow the literature by choosing a CES general specifica-
tion
u (c,m) =
1
1− σ
³
ωc
η−1
η + (1− ω)m
η−1
η
´η(1−σ)
η−1
(25)
We draw on the money demand literature to choose the parameter values of the utility
function. We follow Chari et al. (2000) who estimated an interest elasticity η = 0.39 on the
United States for the postwar period. We set the share parameter ω = 0.98 to reproduce the
observed amount of money on GDP. As there is no standard definition of money in this literature
(M1 or M2), we use the average value of M1/GDP and M2/GDP which is about 0.30 on the
same period.
Table 1: Benchmark calibration
Parameters β α δ ω η
Values 0.96 0.36 0.1 .98 0.39
Employment Process
Regarding the employment process, the key goal of the calibration is to find a stylized
process for wages empirically relevant and which is able to replicate the US wealth distribution
- in particular the fraction of people who are borrowing constrained.
We follow Domeij and Heathcote (2003) who estimated a rather stylized process to match
some of these criteria. The authors found that one needs at least three employment states to
match two main features of the wealth distribution estimated by Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997): a
Gini coeﬃcient of 0.78 and the fact that the two poorest quintiles of the distribution hold only
1.35 percent of the total wealth. Thus e =
©
eh, em, el
ª
where eh stands for high productivity, em
for medium productivity, el for low productivity. The ratio between the diﬀerent productivity
levels and the transition probabilities are set in order to match the autocorrelation ρ = 0.9 and
the innovation σ = 0.224 in the individual earnings estimated on the PSID. The implied ratio
of productivity values are e1/e2 = 6.06 and e2/e3 = 5.02. And the Markov chain consistent with
the observed earning process is p1,1 = p3,3 = 0.9 and p2,2 = 0.988
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Q =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p1,1 1− p1,1 0
1−p2,2
2 p2,2
1+p2,2
2
0 1− p1,1 p1,1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Yet it is important to stress that Domeij and Heathcote (2003)’s calibration still fails to
reproduce the fraction of people who are borrowing constrained since this fraction is equal to
zero in their set-up. However a bulk of empirical evidence suggest that the fraction of household
liquidity constrained is sizeable. In our benchmark calibration, 31 percent of the population is
credit constrained. This number is a little bit higher than the one found by Jappelli (1990) in
the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance that about 20 percent of the US population was liquidity
constrained. But, recent estimations (Grant, 2003) show that this number is not unrealistic.
Table 2 reports the main statistics reproduced by our model under the benchmark calibration
with endogenous prices and distorting inflation taxes. The benchmark calibration matches
closely the key observed ratio of capital K/Y = 2.8, of money (M/P )/Y = 0.32 and of public
debt G/Y = 0.22. Moreover, the calibration yields a tax rate on labor and capital χ = 0.31 quite
close to the observed one (Domeij and Heathcote, 2003). Importantly enough, the benchmark
set-up matches the Gini coeﬃcient of wealth and consumption and is able to replicate both the
upper tail and the lower tail of the wealth distribution.
Table 2: Benchmark calibration
Values Data
Benchmark
economy
K/Y 2.5 2.8
(M/P)/Y 0.30 0.32
G/Y 0.20 0.22
χ 0.36 0.31
Gini Wealth 0.78 0.80
Gini Consumption 0.22 0.23
Wealth 80-100 79.5 84
4 Results
We first consider the benchmark version of the model presented in the previous section. We
document in this set-up the eﬀects of monetary policy on individual behavior and aggregate
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variables. Secondly, we disentangle the diﬀerent channels through which inflation is likely to
aﬀect aggregate economic outcomes.
4.1 Inflation and individual policy rules
As a first stage we document the eﬀect of inflation on individual policy rules and the induced
interactions between asset holdings and real money balances.
Figure 1 reports the consumption policy rule as a function of both the level of labor pro-
ductivity and the current period total wealth q, which includes financial and monetary wealth.
Consumption is an increasing function along these two dimensions. As a standard result, the in-
crease is not linear, the marginal propensity to consume being much higher for low level of wealth
and low values of productivity. Indeed, the level of consumption is smaller for low wealth, low
productivity agent and the value function is much more concave for this type of agent compared
to high productivity worker.
Figure 1 also reports the level of next period financial asset holdings and real money balances
as a function of the level of labor productivity and the current period total wealth. Both policies
are an increasing function of total current wealth . Medium and low productivity workers are
always dis-savers in financial asset while high productivity households are net savers in financial
assets except at very high level of wealth. This behavior is the result of the three states model
used to simulate the status on the labor market, and it is also found in Heathcote (2005). The
asset holdings policy rules for medium and low productivity households display kinks at low
level of current wealth. In this case these two types of workers dis-save all their capital stock
and only carry on real balances into next period to smooth their consumption.
Figure 2 reports the ratio of next period money balances over next period total wealth m
0
q0
as a function of current total wealth q across the three levels of productivity. When the level of
current wealth decreases, medium and low productivity households carry on more cash in their
total wealth into the next period. Indeed, when q becomes very small these households become
credit constraint an use only money as a store of value. Indeed, the ratio m
0
q0 tends toward 1
when q become smaller and smaller. By contrast, this ratio is lower for the high productivity
households at low level of current wealth q, since they are always net-savers in asset holding.
For higher value of q the high productivity households, who have a high income, holds relatively
more money in their total wealth, because, as they have a high income they consume more and
hold relatively more money because of its liquidity services. As a consequence, we find that low
wealth households hold relatively more money than high wealth households. This behavior is
empirically relevant and is obtained as an endogeneous outcome of credit constraints contrary
to Erosa and Ventura (2002).
Figure 3 reports the evolution pattern of consumption, savings and money balances as a
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function of time. For the sake of illustration, we simulate the time path of a given individual
who starts with zero net wealth in the highest labor market state and then alternates between
each labor market states every forty periods. Figure 3 illustrates that individuals save both in
financial assets and in real balances in the highest productivity states only and dis-save in the
two lower ones. Thus these two diﬀerent stores of value behave exactly in the same manner
in order to smooth consumption intertemporaly. But since real balances also yields liquidity
services, they follow a much closer path to that of consumption compared to asset holdings.
Let us now turn to the eﬀect of inflation on the diﬀerent individual policy rules. Figure 4
reports the impact of a one percent rate increase in inflation from π = 2% to π = 3% on next
period asset holdings and money balances as a function of beginning of period total wealth. The
focus is put on the policy rules around the kink where the main non-linearity lies. We focus on
the high and the low productivity states, households in the medium state having similar policy
rules as the low productivity ones. For high value of productivity, an increase in inflation provides
more incentives to save in financial assets at the expense of real money balances whose value
has been slashed by inflation. This behavior stands in sharp contrast with that of households in
lower productivity states. These households are borrowing constrained on asset holdings at low
level of total wealth. In this case they have no other choice than increasing their level of money
balances following a rise in inflation in order to sustain their level of consumption. Indeed,
money is used as a store of value, and the revenue eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect when
wealth is low, as explained in the discussion of equality (15). Their level of real money balances
decreases only at higher level of total wealth for which credit constraints on financial assets
are no longer binding. This contrasted eﬀect suggest that the impact of inflation on economic
outcomes and welfare crucially depends on borrowing constraints. This analysis is carried on in
the next section.
4.2 Aggregate outcomes of inflation
This section assesses the aggregate outcomes of inflation. We focus on a policy experiment in
which the inflation rate rises by one point from π = 2 percent to π = 3 percent. As a first step,
we focus on the general equilibrium eﬀect of inflation in the benchmark model. We then sort
out the diﬀerent channels identified in the model through which inflation aﬀects the economy,
namely the price channel, the redistributive tax channel and the Tobin channel. Eventually,
the welfare eﬀects of inflation are quantified depending on the productivity and the wealth of
households.
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4.2.1 General equilibrium eﬀect
To gauge the impact of inflation, we assume that the inflation rate rises by one point from π = 2
percent to π = 3 percent. Table 3 presents the aggregate outcome of such a monetary shock
for diﬀerent assumptions concerning the adjustment process of the economy. The benchmark
situation corresponds to the model presented in the previous section, where taxes and the interest
rate are endogenous.
Table 3 reports the results of diﬀerent simulation to disentangle the eﬀect of inflation. Col-
umn A provides the total value of financial savings, columnM is the total real quantity of money
in circulation, C is total consumption, χa is the coeﬃcient for the tax on capital and χw is the
coeﬃcient of the tax on labor. In the benchmark model, these two values are equal, what will
not be the case in other simulations, finally the last column gives the value of the real interest
rate. Table 3 - line 1 reports the variables normalized to 100 in the benchmark situation with
π = 2 percent.
Table 3 - line 2 reports the general equilibrium eﬀect of a rise by one point in inflation. In
this set up both interest rates, wages, and taxes on capital and labor wages are endogenous,
and adjust to the rise in inflation. Consistently with individual behavior, inflation crowds out
the aggregate level of money demand by 6.11% at the benefit of aggregate capital which rises
by 1.2 percent. This rise leads to an overall increase in stationary consumption by 0.13 percent.
Capital and labor income are taxed at the same rate. Since more resources are levied by the
inflation tax, the tax rate on labor and capital income decreases by 1.2 percent. This decrease
in the tax on capital favors capital accumulation. By contrast, the variation in the interest rate
lowers the incentive to save in general equilibrium. The rise in aggregate capital supply leads to
a decrease in the interest rate by 0.65 percent. Since the eﬀects of inflation heavily depend on
taxes and interest rates, the next two sections sort out these channels.
4.2.2 Decomposition of inflation eﬀects
Redistributive eﬀect of inflation tax
We first focus on the inflation eﬀect transiting through distorting taxes, namely the Phelps
eﬀect. Table 3 - line 3 reports the aggregate impact of a rise in inflation to π = 3 percent when
the distorting tax on capital χa is constant and equals to its value in the benchmark case. The
real interest rate adjusts to balance financial markets, and the tax on labor is determined such
that the budget of the government is balanced. Since the inflation tax is no longer used as a
means to decrease tax on capital, the latter one is higher and the incentives to save are lower.
Thus the aggregate capital stock only increases by 0.16 percent which is lower compared to the
general equilibrium situation. Meanwhile, the demand for money decreases by 6.16% since the
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Table 3: Aggregate impact of inflation
Economies
Aggregate eﬀects of an increase in inflation
π = 2%→ 3%
A M C χa χw r
1) Benchmark at 2% 100 100 100 100 100 100
2) Benchmark at 3% 100.39 93.89 100.13 98.8 98.8 99.35
3)
Redistributive
inflation tax eﬀect
100.16 93.84 100.07 100 98.65 99.8
4)
General equilibrium
prices eﬀect
101.05 94.00 100.27 100 98.5 100
5) Tobin eﬀect 100.50 93.50 99.58 100 100 100
value of real balances is slashed by inflation. Thus these two oﬀsetting eﬀects on capital and
real balances lead to a slower increase in consumption by 0.07% compared to the benchmark
economy. Regarding tax on labor, its level is lower compared to the benchmark set-up since all
the resources brought about by the seigniorage rents are used to decrease this tax. Eventually,
since there is less capital accumulation, the interest rate decreases only by 0.2%.
General equilibrium price eﬀects
We push further the analysis by controlling for the eﬀect of inflation transiting through
interest rate and wages. For that purpose we set these prices at their value in the benchmark
economy with an inflation rate of 2 percent. The tax on capital χa is also held constant and
kept at is value in the benchmark economy with a 2 percent inflation rate. But, the tax on labor
adjusts to balance the budget of the State. This situation typically refers to the one of a small
open economy with perfect capital mobility, and hence where the interest rate before and after
tax is determined by the rest of the world3 and are the same as in the benchmark economy.
Table 3- line 4 reports the implied eﬀect of inflation in this set-up. The increase in aggregate
capital by 1.05 percent is much higher compared to the situation with endogenous prices since
the return on capital is no longer decreasing as the aggregate savings increase. It turns out that
the general equilibrium price eﬀects are sizeable since the rise in aggregate capital is about six
times as large as the one yielded with endogenous prices and the same tax structure on capital
(Table 3 - line 3). As before the resources levied by the inflation tax are higher than in the
3Households can save in foreign financial markets, and private firms can be financed abroad.
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benchmark economy, what contributed to decrease the resources levied by labor taxes χw. The
real money demand decreases, but a little bit less than in the previous economy since households
are wealthier on average. They also consume more for the very same reason.
Tobin eﬀects
We end up this analysis of inflation by isolating the Tobin eﬀect. This channel boils down
to a substitution eﬀects between asset holdings and real balances only due to a change in the
opportunity cost to hold money while income and taxes remain constant. To that end, Table 3
- line 5 reports the eﬀect of a one percent rise of inflation to π = 3% when: i) the after tax real
interest rate takes on the same value as the one in the benchmark set-up with π = 2% and ii) the
after tax labor income is the same as in the benchmark set-up. Hence, any eﬀects of inflation
on the tax system and hence on the revenue of households are cancelled out. The economy
behaves as the one of a small open economy in which the State consumes all the revenue from
the inflation tax.
The Tobin eﬀect turns out to be sizeable. Table 3 - line 5 indicates that financial savings
increase by 0.5%. Money demand decreases by 6.5%. Importantly enough, consumption now
decreases by 0.42%. This negative impact stems from the fact that government not only finances
the public good but also consumes the additional resources levied by inflation tax. Hence, it
now consumes more than in the previous frameworks.
Accountability of inflation eﬀects
Table 4 reports the quantitative impact of each channel on aggregate capital. Four eﬀects
can be disentangled. The first one transits through the variation in the distorting tax, the so-
called Phelps Eﬀect. The size of this eﬀect can be measured by the diﬀerence in private savings
between lines 3 and 2 of Table 3, what yields an eﬀect of 0.23 percentage point. The second
eﬀect is linked to the change in the real interest rate induced by the increase in savings. This
general equilibrium price eﬀect is measured by the diﬀerence between lines 4 and 3 of Table
3. Table 4 - Column 2 shows that prices have a first order eﬀect as reported. The negative
variation of the interest rate in the endogenous price set-up lowers the accumulation of capital
by 0.89 percentage point compared to the open-economy framework. The pure Tobin eﬀect is
reported in Table 4-Column 4 where the revenue of households has been kept constant, and
where the change in financial savings is only due to the change in inflation. This eﬀect creates
an increase of 0.5 percentage point in private savings. Finally, Table 4-Column 3 reports the
pure redistributive eﬀect of inflation which amounts to 0.55 percentage point. This eﬀect is
measured by the increase in savings when the after tax interest rate has been kept constant to
control for price eﬀects, and when the Tobin eﬀect has been removed. As a consequence, this
eﬀect corresponds to the diﬀerence between line 4 and line 5 of Table 3. Note that the three
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previous eﬀects only arise in the context of binding credit constraints.
Table 4: Decomposition of inflation eﬀects
Phelps tax
eﬀect (1)
Price
eﬀect (2)
Tobin
eﬀect (3)
Redistributive
eﬀect (4)
Total eﬀet
(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)
0.23 -0.89 0.5 0.55 0.39
Comparison with complete markets
It is worthwhile to quantify the specific contribution of credit constraints and incomplete
market in the analysis of the eﬀect of inflation. For that purpose we compare the previous
results to a complete market economy. In this set-up the real interest rate is determined by the
standard equilibrium relationship 1+(1− χa) rcm = 1β , where the left hand side is the real after
tax interest rate. The upperscript cm stands for complete markets. The equilibrium capital
stock is given by the equality between rcm and the marginal productivity of capital.
First, when taxes on capital are the same as in the benchmark economy, one finds that
the financial savings with complete markets are 13.3% smaller than the one obtained in the
benchmark economy. The reason for this result is that the savings of private agents are higher
with credit constraints because of the precautionary motive : Unconstrained agents self-insure
against the risk of facing credit constraints.
Second, if markets are complete and there are no distorting taxes on capital (χa = 0),
the equilibrium interest rate is given by 1 + r = 1β . This situation yields a value of financial
savings which is 21% higher than the value obtained in the benchmark case. As a consequence,
although there is over-accumulation in the credit constrained economy compared to an economy
with complete markets and the same distorting taxes, there is under-accumulation compared to
the first best capital stock.
4.3 Welfare
4.3.1 Average welfare
We use the standard Aiyagari-McGrattan average welfare criterion defined as the expected
discounted sum of utilities under the equilibrium stochastic stream of consumption and real
balances of infinitely lived agents. The welfare function denoted W weights all agents equally
and is defined at the stationary equilibrium. The welfare function is given by
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W =
Z Z
v(e, q)dλ(e, q)
Following Lucas’ tradition, we measure the welfare gain of inflation as the percentage of
consumption one must give to households living in an environment with low inflation rate to
leave them indiﬀerent with living in another economy with higher inflation rate. The monetary
policy experiment is the same as below and consists of an increase by one point in the inflation
rate from π = 2% to π = 3%. Let c(, q) and m(, q) be the level of consumption and real
balances of the household having a labor productivity  and a level of wealth q. These quantities
are defined at the stationary equilibrium under the benchmark level of inflation π = 2% used in
the calibration. Let c∆π(, q) and m∆π(, q) be the level of these quantities after a change in the
inflation rate, and let λ∆π be the new stationary joint distribution after a change in inflation.
The average welfare gain ∆av is thus defined asZ Z
u ((1 +∆av)c(e, q),m(e, q)) dλ(e, q) =
Z Z
u
¡
c∆π(e, q),m∆π(e, q)
¢
dλ∆π(e, q)
Table 5-Line 1 reports the average welfare eﬀects of inflation depending on the diﬀerent assump-
tions on prices and taxes. Table 5-Col. 1 reports the average welfare cost of inflation in the
benchmark equilibrium model with endogenous prices and taxes. In this set-up, a rise in infla-
tion decreases average welfare by 0.04 percent of consumption. But as shown below, this welfare
cost is much smaller compared to the complete market economy. This result stems from two
contradictory eﬀects of inflation since it leads to an increase in capital and thus in consumption
on one hand, and a decrease in money holdings on the other hand. But the negative impact of
inflation on money holdings outweight the former one in general equilibrium.
Table 5-Line 1 - Col. 2 reports the average welfare eﬀect of inflation when taxes on capital
are held constant at their benchmark value when π = 2 percent and when the real interest rate
adjusts to balance the financial market. In this case, taxes on capital are no longer reduced by
inflation through the seigniorage rents. Thus the rise in capital brought about by inflation is
less pronounced than in the benchmark case. As a matter of fact, the average welfare cost of
inflation increases to -.17 percent of permanent consumption.
Table 5-Line 1 - Col. 3 shows the average welfare eﬀect of inflation when interest rate
and wages are held constant irrespective of the level of inflation. Note that the capital tax
is still assumed to be fixed and that the tax on labor adjusts to balance the budget of the
government. Hence, before and after tax interest rates are fixed. In this environment, the
results are completely overturned. On average, inflation is welfare improving, leading to a rise
in average permanent consumption by 0.32 percent. This result is mainly explained by the key
role played by the interest rate in the incentive to hold asset holdings. Since the return on
capital no longer decreases, it becomes less costly to use this asset to oﬀset the drop in the value
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of real balances. As Table 3 made clear, the average level of capital supply steadily increases in
this case, allowing a much higher consumption. This eﬀect more than outwheigths the decline in
real balances. Thus result suggests that inflation might be welfare-improving in open economies.
Table 5: Average welfare eﬀect of inflation: stationary comparison
Economies
Benchmark
economy
Fixed
capital tax
Fixed
interest rate
Average gains -0.04 -0.17 0.32
Comparison with complete markets
The importance of credit constraints and incomplete markets in assessing the welfare eﬀects
of inflation can be exhibited by comparing the variation in the average welfare in the previous
model with the variation in welfare in an economy with complete markets.
In the case of complete markets, all agents are fully insured against idiosyncratic shocks and
are identical regarding their level of assets, real balances and consumption. As a consequence,
the economy behaves as if a representative agent maximizes her utility with the same taxes and
the same inflation rate. Hence, we construct a simple model with a representative agent who
has the same utility function (25), who receives all labor incomes and who pays taxes on capital
and labor to finance the same amount of public good G. Then, we compute the diﬀerence in
the stationary utility4 from a change in inflation in this framework. As before, the coeﬃcients
on the taxes on labor and capital are equal.
A change in the steady state level of inflation from 2% to 3% decreases welfare of the
representative agent by 0.012 percent. This drop is higher compared to the incomplete market
economy. The decrease in average utility in the benchmark economy with credit constraints
was reaching 0.009 percent, which corresponded to the steady state decrease in consumption of
0.04 percent shown in Table 6. As a consequence, the drop in the utility of the representative
agent is 30 percent higher than that of the average utility in the incomplete market economy.
The diﬀerence between the two results stems from the positive real eﬀect of long run inflation
on aggregate capital and consumption when borrowing constraints are taken into account. As
a consequence, the introduction of credit constraint has a first order eﬀect in the assessment of
the cost of inflation.
4We directly give the levels of utility and not the consumption equivalent in this comparison. Indeed, the
marginal utility of consumption of the representative agent is diﬀerent from the average value in our economy.
Hence, comparing consumption equivalent can be misleading.
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4.3.2 Welfare inequalities
The previous analysis suggested that the average welfare cost of inflation was lower under in-
complete market economies compared to complete markets. Yet this average result might hide
important welfare disparities across households depending on their level of productivity and
wealth.
To investigate this issue, we calculate the welfare eﬀects of inflation for the wealthiest and the
poorest high productivity, medium productivity and low productivity households. Importantly
enough, the measure of welfare is defined in expected utility terms and thus considers the cost
of transition.5 We compare the expected utility of agents who start from the same initial level of
wealth q and productivity e but who live under two diﬀerent environments with a lower inflation
rate π = 2 percent and a higher inflation rate π = 3 percent. More notations are necessary
to explain this cost of inflation. Define s0 = (e0, q0) as the initial state of an households. It is
defined by the initial status on the labor market and the initial wealth. Let et = {e1, ..et} be the
history of the household at period t. Let ct(et, s0) be the equilibrium consumption after history
et for a household with initial state s0 = (e0, q0) in the benchmark case where π = 2 percent.
Let c∆πt (e
t, s0) be the equilibrium consumption in the case in which there is an increase ∆π in
inflation from π = 2 percent to π = 3 percent. Note that we are considering an household with
the same initial state in two diﬀerent environments. The welfare gain as the result of the rise
in inflation is defined as the constant percentage rise ∆s0 in consumption in the low inflation
rate case that gives the household the same expected utility as when the inflation is higher. The
welfare gain ∆s0 thus solves
∞X
t=0
X
e∈Et
βtu
¡
(1 +∆s0)c(e
t, s0),m(et, s0)
¢
µ(et, s0) =
∞X
t=0
X
e∈Et
βtu
¡
c∆π(et, s0),m∆π(et, s0)
¢
µ∆π(et, s0)
where µ(et, s0) is the probability of history et given initial state s0, in the economy with π = 2%,
and µ∆π(et, s0) is the same probability in the economy with an increase in inflation. We use this
equation to calculate the expected welfare gains for households starting from a level of wealth
held by the poorest 5 percent poorest and the wealthiest 5 percent in stationary equilibrium with
π = 3 percent. Moreover we assume that the level of taxes and prices are constant during all the
transitions. They take on their stationary equilibrium values found for the two economies with
5A standard steady-state comparison would overestimate the gain of inflation, in particular for the wealth-
poorest. Actually, as suggested by Figure 4, households who are credit constrained have to increase the level of
real balances when inflation rises in order to sustain consumption. Thus in steady state comparison, the wealth-
poor low productivity workers turn out to be much better-oﬀ. But obviously the increase in real balances is costly
in consumption terms during the transition path of accumulation. This cost is taken into account in our expected
utility comparison.
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low and high inflation rates. This assumption boils down to consider that we focus on a marginal
proportion of households who do not influence equilibrium prices during the transitions6.
Table 6: Distributional welfare eﬀects of inflation: transitions
Economies
Benchmark
economy
Fixed
capital tax
Fixed
interest rate
Productivity Wealth
High Poorest 5%
Richest 5%
0.05
-0.38
0.01
-0.42
0.35
0.16
Medium Poorest 5%
Richest 5%
0.11
-0.35
0.08
-0.38
0.25
0.06
Low Poorest 5%
Richest 5%
0.18
-0.34
0.12
-0.37
0.31
0.01
Table 6 - Column 1 reports the various welfare gains of inflation under the benchmark
economy with endogenous prices and endogenous capital taxes (that is the economy described
in Table 3 - line 2). It turns out that inflation has unequal eﬀects across agents depending
on their initial level of wealth and labor productivity. Firstly inflation is welfare-improving for
the wealth-poor households while it decreases welfare for the wealthiest 5 percent. Secondly
the lower the level of productivity,the higher the welfare gains. In particular regarding the 5
percent wealth-poor, the welfare gain of inflation raises from 0.05 percent for high productivity
households to 0.18 percent for low productivity workers. These results are mainly due to a price
eﬀect. By increasing the level of average capital, inflation raises the level of wages and decreases
that of interest rates. Thus inflation benefits more to people whose main income depends on
labor, that is to the wealth-poor. And this increase in wages is relatively more praised by the
worker with the lowest labor productivity.
Table 6 - Column 2 reports the heterogeneity in the welfare eﬀects of inflation when taxes on
capital are held constant at their value of π=2 percent (the economy described in Table 3 - line
3). In this case, the welfare gains of inflation for the wealth-poor are lower and the welfare costs
of inflation for the wealthiest are higher compared to the benchmark economy with endogenous
capital tax. This result is driven by the fact that the accumulation of capital is more costly since
the tax on capital is higher. This negative eﬀect is all the more pronounced for the wealthiest
6This assumption would no longer be relevant if we were to calculate the average welfare gains. This is one
additional reason why we focused on stationary equilibrium comparison to calculate the average welfare gain of
inflation in the previous section.
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people whose income is mainly made up of capital.
Eventually, Table 6 - Column 3 shows that inflation is welfare improving for all categories
of households in an open economy with fixed interest rates. This result stems from the fact
that the accumulation of capital becomes much less costly since the return on capital does not
decrease to balance the financial market. In this case, it is still the case that the wealth-poor
agents benefit more from inflation than the wealthiest households due to decreasing marginal
utility of consumption. Regarding the high productivity agents for instance, the welfare gain of
inflation reaches 0.35 percent of consumption for the wealth-poor against 0.16 percent for the
wealthiest. Yet the new important fact is that the high productivity workers now benefit more
from inflation compared to the low productivity ones since wages are now fixed but they are
more eﬃcient. Moreover interest rate are also fixed but they are set at a higher value compared
to the benchmark economy with endogenous prices. As a conclusion, this result suggests that
the redistributive welfare eﬀect of inflation crucially depends on price adjustments. In particular
this is the upper-class in term of labor productivity which would benefit more from inflation in
a small open economy with exogenous prices.
5 Conclusion
This paper has put to the fore a new channel for the non neutrality of money which hinges
on credit constraints. Incomplete market and borrowing constraints induce an heterogeneity in
households optimal behavior following a change in the inflation rate, because credit constrained
households can not substitute away their real balances for financial assets.
First, we have first shown that this channel has a quantitative sizeable impact in economies
with an empirically relevant wealth distribution. An increase in inflation leads to a substantial
rise in long-run output and consumption. Second, the welfare costs of inflation turn out to be
much smaller in this incomplete market set-up compared to the representative agent framework
in a steady-state comparison à la Lucas. Inflation could even be welfare improving when it
induces a steady increase in aggregate variables in a small open economy with exogenous interest
rate. Furthermore, we found that some households even gain from inflation depending on their
level of wealth and productivity.
The focus of this paper is on long run steady state inflation. But, a promising route for future
research to would be to analyze the short run eﬀect of monetary shock in such a model. Credit
constraints and heterogeneity allow to study the short run redistributive eﬀects of monetary
policy. Moreover, this framework can provide a new relevant channel for the persistence and
non neutrality of monetary shocks, alternatively to sticky prices.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
In this proof, we assume that credit constraints are binding for L households to derive the
equilibrium interest rate. In a second step, Then we check that credit constraints are indeed
binding for L agents and not for H agents. The first order conditions of the firm problem yield
1 + r = αKα−1 and w = (1− α)Kα.
First, using the first order condition (1) and (6) one finds c
L
cH = β (1 + r). The equilibrium
on the good market yields is cH + cL = rK + w. Substituting cH , w and K by their value one
finds
cL = β
1 + r − α
β (1 + r) + 1
µ
α
1 + r
¶ α
1−α
The budget constraint of L agents, given by (8) yields
mL
cL
− m
H
cH
cH
cL
=
sH (1 + r)− cL
cL
Using the value of the ratio c
L
cH = β (1 + r) and the expressions (2) and (10), one finds
φ
1− φ
µ
α
β (1 + r) + 1
1 + r − α − β
¶
=
β
1− β
2
Π (1 + r)
− 1
1 + r − 1Π
(26)
The left hand side is decreasing with r. The right hand side is unambiguously increasing in r.
One can show that the right hand side is increasing in Π. Indeed, define
g (Π) =
β
1− β
2
Π (1 + r)
− 1
1 + r − 1Π
and define the function h such that
h (y) =
y3 (1 + r)3³
1 + r − y2Π (1 + r)
2
´2 (27)
The function h is positive and increasing in its argument. Now, the derivative g0 (Π) can be
written as g0 (Π) = 1Π2
³
h
³
1
1+r
´
− h (β)
´
. As credit constraints are binding, 11+r > β, and hence
one finds that g0 (Π) > 0.
As a consequence, when the equation (26) has a solution r,by the theorem of implicit function
it is a decreasing function of Π. A solution r of (26) is an equilibrium interest rate if 1 + r < 1β .
Here, we simply assume that the values of the parameters are such that it is the case. This is
true for instance for β = 0.96, φ = 0.5, α = 0.3. and Π = 1.02 .
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